

Securing End-to-End Provenance: A Systems and Storage Perspective

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Provenance



- Shuttle launch relies on thousands of systems and millions of parts all working together correctly: enormously complex
- File systems for HEC are similarly complex - originates from many sources and synthesized by complex and sometimes hidden processes
- What does the data mean and how can we interpret and analyze it?



Data Provenance



- Data provenance allows us to answer the following questions about the origin of data:
 - Who or what contributed to the generation of this data?
 - What is the data based upon?
 - When was the data generated?
 - Why was it generated?
 - How was it generated?
- A history of the object from origin through subsequent modifications is evidenced by a provenance chain (DAG)

End to End Provenance System



- Why another provenance collection system?
 - Strong security guarantees
 - Distributed provenance collection
 - EEPS will achieve the above two goals efficiently in high end computing systems




Secure Provenance Collection



- Provenance monitor (PM) analogous to reference monitor concept
- Three guarantees
 - Complete mediation
 - Tamperproofness
 - Verifiability
- Beyond authentication of records
 - Integrity/Trustworthiness of recording instrument and provenance-enhanced applications

Project Initiatives






Provenance chain constructions and query management (Sion, Winslett)

Provenance Monitor




- Implementing LSM-based provenance monitor
 - LSM for complete mediation, tamperproofing
- Tracking provenance of entire VM runs
 - Created graph of entire process ancestry
 - Investigated visualizations which included file reads/writes
- Exploring potential for secure multi-host and interdomain provenance



Autonomously Secure Disks



- Enforce security perimeter at external I/O interface
 - How? Store all security metadata including provenance information within the drive itself




"New Security Architectures Based on Emerging Disk Functionality", IEEE Security and Privacy, Sept/Oct 2010

Host Validation



- Portable storage holds more and is more ubiquitous than every before (256 GB flash drives)
 - Public/private data on devices, want to share some info but protect other data


- How can we solve these issues?
 - Only allow registered devices on system
 - Virus scanning on flash drive
 - General problem: How do we know if the system we share data with is in a good (valid) state? Can we collect a provenance record relating to this data?



Kells



- USB storage device performs attestations with host in order to determine its integrity state
- Periodically repeat attestation to get continuous guarantee of host integrity
- Allow access to trusted partition only if system is in a good state



Continuous Attestation



- Support framework for runtime monitoring on system
 - Patagonix, Pioneer, BIND, LKIM, etc.
- Continuous attestation gives assurance that the system is in a good state
 - Length of time between attestations can be parameterized by an attestation period Δ_t
 - Acts as security heartbeat
- Quarantine buffer on storage device holds writes until system state is attested



Kells Security Properties



- **SEC:** "Any read request completed by Kells was made while the host was in a good state."
 - attestation received within Δ_t of the request and the system was not rebooted
- INT: "Any write request completed by Kells was made while the host was in a good state."
 - \blacktriangleright same dependency on attestation received within Δ_t as with **SEC**

$$\begin{aligned} (\mathbf{SEC}) \; \vdash \; & \forall \; \; (\mathbf{t_{req}},(l,n)), (\mathbf{t_{att}},sig),t \; \; \text{s.t.} \\ & \; \; (\mathbf{t_{req}},(l,n)) = \mathsf{Recv}(\mathcal{D}) \; @ \; t \\ & \; \; \; (t, \mathbf{t_{req}},(l,n)) = \mathsf{Peek}(\mathcal{D}) \\ & \wedge \; \; (\mathbf{t_{att}},sig) = \mathsf{Recv}(\mathcal{D}) \\ & \wedge \; \; (\mathbf{t_{att}},sig) = \mathsf{Recv}(\mathcal{D}) \\ & \wedge \; \; e = \mathsf{SRead}(\mathcal{D},(t,\mathbf{t_{req}},(l,n)),(\mathbf{t_{att}},sig)) \\ & \supset \; \mathsf{GoodState}(\mathcal{H},(t,\mathbf{t_{req}},(l,n)),(\mathbf{t_{att}},sig)) \\ & \supset \; \mathsf{GoodState}(\mathcal{H},(t,\mathbf{t_{req}},(l,n)),(\mathbf{t_{att}},sig)) \\ \end{aligned}$$

Bottom Line: Provides formal proof that data is protected.

Future Project Goals



- Revealing file access patterns
 - What is "least privilege?"
 - Forensic details of file and block access: "Which host accessed this particular data and where may that information have been disseminated?"
- Information flow systems
 - Provenance as enriched information flows
- Provenance calculus
 - Formalism for expressing and querying provenance data
 - Working toward more rigorous definitions of provenance
 - Potential for machine learning applications

Performance Enhancements



- Provenance monitor profiling
 - Enhanced profiling tools
 - Profiling provenance collection for workloads from scientific domains
 - EEPS calibration for a particular environment
 - LSM instrumentation
- Cost models for provenance collection
 - Hardware and storage requirements (\$/GB)
 - New cost models based on types of provenance data collected and system architectures



Securing End-to-End Provenance

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Systems Problems

- Reliable high-volume data transmission from kernel to userspace
 - Currently using Linux relay mechanism
 - Investigating other means to increase reliability
- Inclusion of filenames in inode tracking
 - LSM provides little context here
 - Would provide additional information during analysis


Distributed PM




- Challenges in distributed provenance
- Domain specific policies for:
 - Auditors confidentiality considerations
 - Cryptographic commitments [Hasan'09]
 - Divergent modification histories
 - Plausible version history
 - If necessary, plausible history may be checked against previous subjects in the ownership chain


Distributed Environments













Example: File transfer between hosts with untrusted OSes and trusted storage









A program initiates a request for the file.






A secure tunnel is established between disks through the untrusted OS.





The document is transferred as normal.





The destination disk checks the integrity once the writethrough is completed and appends a new provenance entry.

Distributed Provenance Overheads



- Overhead increases monotonically as data is shared.
- Two implications:
 - Storage costs within a single domain
 - High sharing factor: redundant provenance data
 - Long per-host modification histories: higher redundancy factor
 - Even though document size may remain constant!
 - Audit costs between domains
 - As sharing of a document increases, the computational cost of sharing increases